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DISCRETIONARY DOCKETS
Randy J. Kozel and Jeffrey A. Pojanowski'
Fifty-five years ago, Professor Henry Hart examined "the
volume of the [Supreme] Court's business and . . . the ways in
which the business is done."' After estimating how much time the
Justices had available to deliberate and draft opinions in a given
Term, Hart concluded that the Court was resolving far too many
cases by full opinion.2 He also drew a connection between the
Court's overstuffed docket and the quality of its work. For Hart,
the absence of time necessary for "the maturing of collective
thought" ensured that few of the Court's opinions could
"genuinely illumine the area of law" in question; others failed
"even by much more elementary standards."' Reasoned and
principled elaboration of the law, Hart contended, takes more
time than the Supreme Court was able to give.
Judging by the numbers, one might think Professor Hart
would be happier today. Hart assumed an average of 117 opinions
of the Court each Term.4 During October Term 2014, the Court
issued only 74 such opinions, of which eight were summary
reversals.' That performance was almost identical to the Court's
October 2013 Term, which yielded 73 opinions, including six
* Professors of Law, Notre Dame Law School. For helpful questions and
comments, the authors thank Amy Barrett, Will Baude, A.J. Bellia, Barry Cushman, Erin
Delaney, Orin Kerr, James Lindgren, John McGinnis, Mark McKenna, Andrea Pin,
Richard Re, Amanda Tyler, Rachael Walsh, Mark Walters, and Paul Yowell. They are
also grateful for the opportunity to present the paper at the Notre Dame Program on
Constitutional Structure's roundtable in London, England on "The Common Law in an
Age of Regulation," as well as the Federalist Society's 2016 Faculty Conference.
1. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court-Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84,84 (1959).
2. Id. at 99.
3. Id. at 100.
4. Id. at 90-91.
5. Final Stat Pack for October Term 2014, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30,2015, 11:23 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term-2014/. Two cases
were dismissed after argument. Id.
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summary reversals.' These numbers are typical of a Court that
now rarely decides more than 80 cases in a Term.' And the Court's
docket shows no signs of expanding. If anything, the Justices are
becoming more cautious in selecting cases for review. Recent
years have witnessed the emergence of an informal "cooling off"
period between the Court's initial discussion of a case and its
order granting certiorari.' Assuming that this certiorari two-step
holds, we can expect even more petitions to be rejected as "fact-
bound" or beset by "vehicle problems," two phrases that the
Justices' law clerks customarily invoke.
In theory, the Court's slim docket should allow it to leverage
the luxury of time to enhance the clarity of its pronouncements
and rationales. By crafting broad and comprehensive opinions,
the Court could counterbalance the infrequency of its
interventions. Such a Rulemaking Court would "illumine the law"
through the reasoned elaboration Hart thought incumbent upon
the nation's highest tribunal.' Likewise, maintaining a smaller
docket gives the Court more time to ensure that the choices
undergirding its rules are grounded in sound empirical,
normative, and historical judgments."o While the Court's
contributions may be relatively few and far between, they could
be wide-ranging and deeply reasoned.
The corollary is that if the Supreme Court's docket were
markedly larger-as it was for much of the twentieth century-its
ability to function effectively as a rulemaker would suffer, as
Professor Hart suggested. The natural mode of decisionmaking
for a Court that confronts an onerous docket is not wide-ranging
6. Final Stat Pack for October Term 2013 and Key Takeaways, SCOTUSBLOG (July
3, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/final-stat-pack-for-october-term-
2013-and-key-takeaways-2/. As in October Term 2014, two cases were dismissed after
argument. Id.
7. See generally Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012).
8. See John Elwood, Relist Watch: What Does the Court's Relist Streak Mean?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 23, 2014, 11:50 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/relist-watch-
what-does-the-courts-relist-streak-mean/.
9. See Hart, supra note 1, at 100.
10. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL
REASONING 25-26 (2008) (arguing that courts either "reason deductively from rules




rulemaking, but fact-specific adjudication." To be sure, an
Adjudicating Court is aware that its pronouncements will affect
subsequent cases by informing the rule of decision that future
judges deduce and apply. 12 Yet the Adjudicating Court does not
try to set out broad rules to govern situations beyond the case
before it. Rather, such a Court makes its impression over time by
resolving a string of disputes, each of which represents a marginal
and incremental contribution to the development of the law.
We can compare the Rulemaking Court and Adjudicating
Court with the Reluctant Court, which decides few cases and does
so narrowly. The same impulses-such as a restrained vision of
the judicial role or a deferential posture toward the political
branches-that drive a court to limit its docket may also lead it to
be guarded and tentative in the decisions it renders. Even so, from
a guidance perspective the Reluctant Court does precious little. It
calls to mind Professor Hart's lament about questions being
"ducked which in good lawyership and good conscience ought not
to be ducked" and opinions that "fail to build the bridge between
the authorities they cite and the results they decree."13
There is one other option for how case selection can interact
with decisionmaking mode. An Experimental Court resolves
numerous cases and does so with comprehensive, wide-ranging
rules. Notwithstanding its impressive ambition, the Experimental
Court raises in fullest form the central concern noted by Professor
Hart: a court that does too much might not do anything well.
In practice, the lines between these decisionmaking modes
are often blurred. That, we submit, is all the more reason to pay
attention to them. Whether the Supreme Court is understood as
a unified institution or a collection of individual actors (or both), 4
its willingness to shift between decisionmaking modes raises
important questions about its role-and its own conception of
that role-in the constitutional order. These questions are salient
11. Cf SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-07 (1947) (discussing an
administrative agency's choice to develop law through rulemaking or adjudication).
12. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 6
(1991) ("[T]he judicial establishment of legal rules would occur even if the sole function of
the courts was to resolve disputes.").
13. Hart, supra note 1, at 100-01 (quoting Alexander Bickel & Harry H. Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1,
3 (1957)).
14. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive
Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. IssuEs 549 (2005).
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as the Court moves forward from a 2014 Term marked by
contentious debates over the judiciary's place in the political and
social landscape," followed by a 2015 Term in which the death of
Justice Antonin Scalia forced the Court to examine how to fufill
its role with only eight members. It is a good time to step back and
consider more broadly the different modes of decisionmaking and
their interaction with the Court's principles for deciding when and
where to intervene.
It is common knowledge that the Supreme Court's docket is
almost entirely discretionary. That means the Justices decide for
themselves which cases to review and which to let pass. What we
wish to emphasize is that while the Court's docket is indeed
discretionary, its strategy in selecting cases should affect how it
crafts its opinions -at least if the provision of guidance is among
the Court's core objectives. Case-selection may be discretionary
and still create important obligations for the way in which judges
go about their work. Or so we claim.
This Essay examines the dynamics of the Rulemaking Court,
the Adjudicating Court, the Reluctant Court, and the
Experimental Court. We highlight the relationship between a
court's mode of decisionmaking, docket management, and sense
of institutional role. Our focus is the Supreme Court's treatment
of constitutional law, whose derivation and evolution provides a
rich topic of study. Whether the Supreme Court operates with a
large docket or a small one, it can decide cases in a manner that
crystallizes legal norms and provides guidance to the legal
community and society at large. Yet for the Court to serve these
functions effectively, its mode of decisionmaking must align with
its strategy in filling (or not) its docket.
We suggest that in seeking to furnish guidance and enhance
clarity, a supreme court that resolves a small number of cases is
well served to decide those cases in relatively broad terms
supported by relatively deep reasoning. By comparison, a court
that decides a greater number of cases will have more
opportunities to clarify the law through incremental
interventions. General rules can emerge over time through the
15. See Adam Liptak, Justices' Opinions Grow in Size, Accessibility, and Testiness,
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,2015, at A17. The most obvious example is Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Others include Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015); and
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
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repeated application of law to fact. This gradual evolution is
important, because a court that is busy with an onerous docket
will have less time to devote to any single case. We also examine
the Reluctant and Experimental approaches to constitutional law,
which we conclude are ill-suited to the provision of sound
guidance. They become attractive only if a court understands
itself as primarily concerned with something other than the
development and crystallization of legal principles.
I. LEGAL GUIDANCE AND DECISIONMAKING STYLE
The U.S. Supreme Court contributes to the development of
constitutional law by offering reasoned results. The Court issues
not merely decisions, but opinions. This point may seem almost
too banal to mention, but it turns out to be crucial to the structure
of American constitutional law, for it connects the Supreme Court
to the common law tradition.
Here we are adopting a more capacious definition of
common law judging than is sometimes employed. Owing to the
thoughtful work of scholars such as David Strauss, common law
constitutionalism is often depicted as standing in tension with
text-centric methodologies such as originalism.16 To some, that
tension might suggest that one can be faithful to the common law
tradition or to the Constitution's enacted text, but not to both.
And, indeed, there are ways in which particular versions of
originalism and common law constitutionalism find themselves in
conflict. But in general, there is no contradiction in the view that
original meanings and judicial precedents both have a significant
role to play in shaping the trajectory of constitutional law. For
example, one might conclude that the development of
constitutional law can and should proceed through the accretion
of judicial decisions even while recognizing value in adhering to
the Constitution's text.17 Or one might give primacy to the
Constitution's original meaning while falling back on judicial
precedent when the original meaning is too uncertain to resolve a
16. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHi. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) (juxtaposing originalism and common law constitutionalism).
17. Cf id. at 906-16 (discussing the role of constitutional text within common law
constitutionalism).
2016] 225
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particular question." This overlap is reinforced by the fact that
the common law tradition encompasses fidelity to judicial
precedents and enacted texts just as it does fidelity to other
sources of legal meaning."
The relationship between text, precedent, and the common
law method also bears on recent debates over constitutional
''construction." Some commentators contend that when the
Constitution's text is underdeterminate-when efforts at
semantic "interpretation" leave multiple options on the table-
judges must rely on normative commitments to assist in
"constructing" constitutional law.20 There are a variety of
intriguing dimensions to constitutional construction, and there are
important challenges to the legitimacy of construction as a judicial
enterprise. 2 ' For present purposes, we take no sides on the
interpretation/construction debates, and we surely take no sides
on larger questions such as the validity of originalism as an
interpretive methodology. We simply note that whether it is
labeled as common law constitutionalism or constitutional
construction or something else, much of what the Supreme Court
does is consistent with the idea of developing constitutional rules
through the creation, crystallization, and reconsideration of
doctrine over time. As a descriptive matter, "our written
constitution has ... become part of an evolutionary common law
system." 22  But evolution need not entail marginalizing
constitutional text or original meanings. The validity of
constitutional development through precedents and doctrines
does not depend on one's allegiance to originalism, living
constitutionalism, or any other interpretive methodology. There
are myriad ways for judges-even judges whose primary
allegiance is to text and history-to interpret the Constitution in
a manner that bears hallmarks of the common law method.
18. See Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 105, 108 (2015) (defending a substantial role for judicial precedent "when the
Constitution's original meaning cannot confidently be discerned").
19. Cf Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101
VA. L. REV. 1357 (2015) (extending this argument to the context of statutory
interpretation).
20. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMM. 95, 104-06 (2010).
21. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good
Constitution 141 (2013).
22. Strauss, supra note 16, at 885.
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To be sure, the practice of constitutional interpretation does
not share every feature with classical conceptions of the common
law. Most importantly, where constitutional text is clear, it is not
subject to judicial override in the same way that judicial
precedents are.23 Nevertheless, through its use of caselaw to flesh
out legal norms and rules, American constitutional practice stands
as a "central case of common law methodology."2 4
For present purposes, the key question is how the Supreme
Court should exercise its common law mandate within the
constitutional context. Fashioning an answer requires an
accommodation of past and future: a respect for precedents that
have come before combined with awareness of the path of
constitutional law going forward.
The relationship between fidelity to the past and
responsibility for the future is a central theme in the story of the
common law. As early as 1601, the English scholar-lawyer John
Selden identified the common law with the Roman god Janus,
whose two faces look both to yesterday and tomorrow.2 5 The
starting point for a court-including a constitutional court-
operating in the common law tradition is where the law has been.26
But after engaging with the past, the court confronts a choice
regarding the future. It may act as an Adjudicating Court that
concentrates on applying (and, if necessary, adapting) extant legal
principles to the specific facts at hand. Or it may act as a
Rulemaking Court by articulating a broadly applicable rule, along
with a comprehensive description of rationale, to govern
subsequent cases. Whichever approach it adopts, the court's
23. Cf Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 455
(1989) ("[T]he lawmaking power of common law courts is more than interstitial, and
extends to modifying or replacing what had previously been thought to be the governing
rule. . . .").
24. Id. at 470 n. 41.
25. See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2
OXFORD U. COMMONW. L.J. 155,155 (2002) (citing Paul Christianson, Young John Selden
and the Ancient Constitution, ca. 1610-18, 128 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 271, 310 n.
19 (1984)).
26. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 891-92 (linking the common law with the idea that
"one should be very careful about rejecting judgments made by people who were acting
reflectively and in good faith, especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at
least accepted over time," because "[j]udgments of this kind embody not just serious
thought by one group of people, or even one generation, but the accumulated wisdom of
many generations").
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prerogative is to respect the past while shining light on the future
through the issuance of practical guidance.27
In this Part and the next, we examine the Adjudicating and
Rulemaking modes of decisionmaking, which take different paths
toward the common goal of elucidating the meaning of
constitutional law through judicial opinions.
A. ADJUDICATING
The Adjudicating Court draws "on the fund of accumulated
experience recorded in the common law"28 and applies it with
precision to the particular facts at hand. Faced with a challenging
case, the Court "look[s] longer, harder, and deeper" into its store
of exemplars and, by analogy and rational extension, discerns a
resolution from "within the law." 29 This approach, which has deep
roots in classical common law jurisprudence, offers practical
guidance through the steady accumulation and refinement of
judicial reasoning.30 The development of the law is deliberate in
pace and incremental and organic in character.
For an illustration of the Supreme Court operating in
Adjudicating mode, consider its recent Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence originating with Crawford v. Washington.3 Finding
that the Clause's text does not specify what kind of out-of-court
statements are admissible against a defendant in a criminal trial,
the Court turned to the "historical background."3 2 After an
extensive survey of English and American common law history,
the Court concluded that the Clause's requirements apply to
27. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Law's System: The Necessity of System in Common
Law, 2014 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 69,93 (explaining that common law "reasoning is public
and practical, so it is meant to serve the purpose of normative guidance of official and lay
decisions and actions in and for a public").
28. Postema, supra note 25, at 177.
29. Id. at 178-79.
30. Cf Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3
OXFORD U. COMMONW. L.J. 1, 4 (2003) (stating that common law jurists "not only had to
solve the immediate problem at hand, but . . . also had to set an example that could
reasonably be followed in other cases"). For some, case-specific adjudication is the only
approach that can reconcile the provision of forward-looking guidance with the traditional
understanding of the judicial office. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton,
Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 587,594 (2009) ("[T]he Federalist Founders ... evidently did not foresee
the Supreme Court as a superlegislature. The judges they knew merely decided contested
cases in the common law tradition familiar to them.").
31. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
32. Id. at 42-43.
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"testimonial" statements.33 Although the Court offered examples
of the "core class" of those statements, it declined to articulate a
canonical formulation, explaining that the statements at issue
were clearly testimonial.3 4
Crawford thus expanded the reach of the Sixth Amendment
while leaving unanswered numerous questions about the scope of
the confrontation right.35 The Justices disagreed over Crawford's
fidelity to precedent,3 6 but there was no question that the opinion
left much to be done going forward. The Court responded by
returning to the Confrontation Clause on several occasions during
the ensuing Terms, incrementally defining the contours of
"testimonial" statements.37 By keeping the issue on its agenda, the
Court counterbalanced the uncertainty that initially resulted from
its refusal to set forth a canonical formulation in Crawford. In this
respect, Crawford exemplified the Adjudicating mode even as it
redescribed or revised (depending on one's perspective) the
Court's former approach to the Confrontation Clause. Rather
than announcing a new rule that was both general in scope and
broadly determinative in guidance, Crawford left the elaboration
of its approach for future cases." That choice imposed a corollary
duty on the Court to continue developing its rule through
subsequent applications -an obligation the Court discharged by
repeatedly granting certiorari to resolve Confrontation Clause
disputes.
The Court's jurisprudence regarding the jury trial right has
taken a similar path. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court
identified in its decisional law a requirement that any fact-
33. Id. at 51.
34. Id. at 51-52.
35. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) ("[The majority's rule]
casts a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials in both federal and state courts,
and is by no means necessary to decide the present case.").
36. Compare id. ("I dissent from the Court's decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts
."), with id. at 58 (majority opinion) (stating that "[elven our recent cases [like Roberts],
in their outcomes hew closely to the traditional line" between testimonial and non-
testimonial statements).
37. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (expert testimony on DNA
profile is non-testimonial); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (blood-alcohol
analysis report is testimonial); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009)
(laboratory analysis of cocaine is testimonial).
38. See Larry Alexander, "With Me It's All er Nuthin"': Formalism in Law and
Morality, 66 U. CHi. L. REV. 530, 545 (1999) (arguing that "there is a tendency for
generality and determinateness to go together" in rule-based decisionmaking).
2016] 229
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besides the fact of a prior conviction-that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond a statutory maximum must be submitted to the
jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 39 The carve-out for
prior convictions was itself a product of the common law method;
that exception, though discordant as a conceptual matter, was
well-rooted in the Court's precedent.40 While recognizing that the
exception was hard to square with its holding as a matter of logic,
the Court was content to rule more narrowly, focusing on the case
at hand rather than aiming to enhance doctrinal coherence more
broadly. Thus, even as it ushered in an important development in
its constitutional jurisprudence, the Court saw no need to set forth
a capacious, internally consistent rule of the sort we might expect
from a legislature. Nor did the Court try to explain the
ramifications of its rationale for every relevant aspect of the
criminal sentencing regime. Instead, it derived a pertinent
principle and applied it to the situation at hand.
The Apprendi Court left it to subsequent cases to define the
contours of the jury trial right. Those cases have sometimes
extended Apprendi to related issues and contexts.4 1 At other
times, the Court has cabined Apprendi's sweep, as with the factual
findings required for imposing consecutive-running sentences.4 2
Through this sustained series of interventions, the Court has
generated a body of decisions, distinctions, and analogies that
exemplifies the Adjudicating mode.
Beyond high-profile contexts like criminal sentencing and
confrontation of witnesses, the Adjudicating mode also emerges
in less momentous cases. Consider one of Chief Justice Roberts'
earliest opinions, Jones v. Flowers.4 3 There, the Court addressed a
comparatively picayune question of first impression: what steps
the Due Process Clause requires a state to take before selling a
taxpayer's property when a notice of tax sale is returned in the
mail as unclaimed. In ruling for the taxpayer, the Court focused
on the particularities of the statutory regime and the specific
dispute at hand. It identified "several reasonable steps" the State
39. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
40. See id. at 485-89 (discussing cases including Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224 (1998) and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)).
41. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002).
42. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
43. 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
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could have taken under the circumstances, such as addressing the
letter to "occupant" or posting a notice on the front door." For
scholars of the Court who are accustomed to (or tired of)
arguments of high principle, the Justices' discussion of whether
the Arkansas tax commissioner must search the Little Rock
phonebook for a new address-a discussion that was in service of
a narrow, case-specific holding-is remarkably homely. 45
Disclaiming the notion that it was doing anything noteworthy, the
Court explained that "under the circumstances" of the case,
existing due process principles required the state to take
additional measures to give notice of an imminent property sale.46
But while it can extend to mundane cases, the Adjudicating
mode is most notable when it arises in high-profile constitutional
disputes. Take the example of Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
which presented major questions about the appointment and
removal of officers in independent agencies.47 Some
commentators saw the case as raising the specter (or the promise)
of rendering independent agencies unconstitutional.4 8 Yet this
putative watershed yielded only a trickle of doctrinal
development. Clinging closely to precedent, the Court rejected an
Appointments Clause challenge to the relevant agency board. 49
And though the majority offered some sweeping rhetoric about
the importance of presidential control of executive officers, its
constitutional holding was confined to officers insulated by two
layers of removal restrictions." While the dissent criticized the
majority for the destabilizing implications of its ruling, the
majority downplayed those worries and was content to leave
remaining questions for another day." The narrow holding of
44. Id. at 234-35.
45. Id. at 235-36. For the record, the commissioner does not have to.
46. Id. at 225.
47. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
48. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization-PCAOB in the
Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey's Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOzO. L. REV.
2255, 2275 (2011) ("[Challengers] hoped that the Court would reach back to undo the
mischief they believe had been done to that view when in Humphrey's Executor a
unanimous Court permitted Congress to establish agencies whose heads could be removed
only 'for cause."').
49. See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 510 ("Petitioners raise three more
challenges to the Board under the Appointments Clause. None has merit.").
50. Id. at 495-97.
51. See id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Court's "holding
threatens to disrupt severely the fair and efficient administration of the laws"); id. at 506
2016] 231
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unconstitutionality offered challengers not the broad victory they
sought, but only doctrinal and rhetorical fodder for the next day's
fight.5 2 This approach captures the sensibility of the Adjudicating
Court: the province of the Court is to resolve disputes, so once the
outcome of a dispute is clear, the Court has no further business to
transact.
B. RULEMAKING
The Supreme Court sometimes operates squarely in the
mode of Rulemaker. It announces wide-ranging rules that are
manifestly designed to guide the resolution of future disputes not
presently before it.53
A classic example is New York Times v. Sullivan.5 4 Sullivan
provided the Court with an opportunity to articulate broad rules
for the handling of defamation cases against public officials, and
the Court did not disappoint-it offered a "federal rule" that
requires a showing of actual malice in suits relating to a plaintiff's
official conduct." The application of law to the facts at hand
almost seemed an afterthought. Indeed, the Court came close to
apologizing for its engagement with the facts before it, explaining
that its "duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional
principles," but rather must sometimes extend to "review[ing] the
evidence to make certain that those principles have been
constitutionally applied."56 Implicit in the Court's explanation is
an understanding of its role as Rulemaker first and Adjudicator
second (if at all). And the Court's sentiments have proved
prophetic; while Sullivan's underlying facts are important legally
(majority opinion) (avoiding "general pronouncements on matters neither briefed nor
argued here" and responding that "the dissent fails to support its premonitions of doom").
52. See Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions,
and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DuKE J.
CONST. L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (2010).
53. Hart himself seemed to embrace this understanding, or at least to reject the
alternative. See Hart, supra note 1, at 99 (deeming inadequate the notion that the Court is
"engaged primarily in a technical lawyer's job, applying and distinguishing precedents with
relatively little freedom for the play of creative thought").
54. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55. Id. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice."').
56. Id. at 285.
232
DISCRETIONARY DOCKETS
and historically, the case is famous for the general test the Court
articulated.
Another prominent illustration of the Rulemaking Court in
action is Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court announced
detailed warnings to safeguard the privilege against self-
incrimination." Miranda could have been decided on far narrower
grounds; as Judge Easterbrook has observed, Ernesto Miranda
"had not been given any warning," meaning the Court surely did
not need to articulate multiple warnings that must be furnished
going forward." Yet the Court used the case as an opportunity to
reshape interactions between police officers and criminal
suspects. It became, unequivocally and unabashedly, a
Rulemaking Court, announcing "in unqualified terms not only
what the rule of law now was, but also exactly what frontline
agents such as police officers needed to do in order to comply with
it. "59
Roe v. Wade reflects a similar mentality.o Roe recognized a
constitutional right to nontherapeutic abortions under certain
circumstances, but it also went further by announcing a trimester
framework to guide the treatment of abortion cases in future
years. Again, the Supreme Court assumed the mantle of
Rulemaker. That fact was made all the starker by the Court's
subsequent decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which
preserved Roe's central holding but replaced the trimester
framework with an "undue burden" test that is more receptive to
incremental, fact-specific decisionmaking.61
A more recent illustration of the Rulemaking Court comes
from United States v. Stevens.62 Stevens dealt with legislation
aimed at depictions of extreme violence against animals. Among
the arguments presented by the government was that such
57. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("[U]nless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.").
58. See Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 730 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
59. Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick,
2007 Sup. Cr. REV. 205, 207.
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality opinion).
62. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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depictions are proscribable because "the banned depictions of
animal cruelty, as a class, are categorically unprotected by the
First Amendment."6 3 According to the government, First
Amendment protection yields when a category of speech has
societal costs that significantly outweigh its benefits.64
The Stevens Court rejected this submission, dismissing it as
"startling and dangerous."65 But the Court did not confine its
statements to depictions of animal cruelty. Instead, the Court
shifted into Rulemaking mode by announcing a test to govern
future First Amendment disputes: categories of speech are
beyond the First Amendment's protection only when there is a
"long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation."66
To be sure, the Court asserted that its rule had a historical
antecedent." Still, it is difficult to view Stevens as merely
identifying a trend that had emerged over time or converting a
partially-defined standard into a clear rule.66 Prior to Stevens, the
caselaw indicated a different approach-one grounded in cost-
benefit analysis rather than historical excavation -for recognizing
categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. The effect
of Stevens was to discard that inquiry and establish a new rule
going forward."
The practical import of Stevens has also been determined for
many future disputes. While the Court left open the possibility
that it might recognize additional, historically-rooted exceptions
to protection in future cases,70 the number of such exceptions
seems likely to be low. If that prediction is accurate, then Stevens
did not simply announce a rule relating to the depiction of cruelty
63. Id. at 468.
64. See id. at 469-70.
65. Id. at 470.
66. Id. at 469.
67. See id. at 471 ("When we have identified categories of speech as fully outside the
protection of the First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit
analysis . . . .").
68. Cf. Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 103, 124 (2012) ("There is a long-standing scholarly tradition arguing that, as
cases accumulate, courts are driven to move from standards to rules. Experience
accumulates, and judges get familiar with some generic features of situations they
repeatedly confront.").
69. See id. at 113.
70. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472 ("Maybe there are some categories of speech that
have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or
discussed as such in our case law.").
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to animals. It sharply limited an entire modality of constitutional
argument as applied to the freedom of speech. What began as a
dispute about videos featuring animal cruelty ended up as an
inflection point for First Amendment jurisprudence. An
Adjudicating Court could never countenance such a result; there
is no clearer counterpoint to case-by-case determinations than
sweeping rules that range far beyond the facts at hand. In
Stevens-as in Sullivan, Miranda, and Roe-the Rulemaking
Court was at work.n
C. PRECEDENT
The distinction between the Adjudicating and Rulemaking
modes has implications for a court's relationship with precedent.
An Adjudicating Court moves away from disfavored precedents
through a series of incremental steps. Barry Friedman contends
that the Supreme Court has used this technique-albeit in a way
he criticizes for its "stealth"-to distance itself from the Miranda
decision.72 Likewise, David Strauss depicts the evolution of First
Amendment doctrine during the twentieth century as incremental
and halting; he argues that "the key principles were developed
71. The distinction between Adjudicating and Rulemaking bears some similarities
to Professor Eisenberg's useful distinction between a "by-product model" of
decisionmaking, in which "courts establish legal rules only as an incidental by-product of
resolving disputes," and an "enrichment model" of decisionmaking, in which "the
establishment of legal rules to govern social conduct is treated as desirable in itself . .. so
that the courts consciously take on the function of developing certain bodies of law, albeit
on a case-by-case basis." EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 6. For present purposes, we prefer
the concepts of Adjudicating and Rulemaking for two reasons. First, those concepts
highlight the role of the deciding court as an institution, which is this Essay's focal point.
And second, the concepts help to emphasize that Adjudicating and Rulemaking can both
serve, in design as well as effect, as mechanisms for enriching the field of constitutional
law.
72. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention
to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16 (2010). This is not the only technique that
Professor Friedman describes the Court as having utilized; while some of its "cases ate
away at Miranda's rationale like termites at the foundation of a house, leaving the
precedent ostensibly standing but precarious to the point of being uninhabitable," others
"simply hacked off chunks of Miranda or the cases initially implementing it."). Id. For a
different perspective, see Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1865-66 (2014) ("'[Sltealth overruling' is actually neither stealth
nor overruling but just a pejorative term for an underappreciated mainstay of modern
Supreme Court practice. And, like other powerful techniques, narrowing can be legitimate
or not, depending on the situation.") (footnote omitted).
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over fifty years, often through trial and error, with many false
starts and subsequent corrections."73
At other times, the Court is willing to replace an old rule with
a new one in fairly short order. Consider Citizens United v. FEC,7 4
a case that has been the source of extensive debate." Citizens
United expressly overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,7 6 which had taken a restrictive view of the rights of
corporations and labor unions to promote or oppose political
candidates. In theory, the Citizens United Court might have
avoided Austin rather than overruling it. Among the arguments
before the Court was that the relevant statute did not cover the
particular speech at issue,78 that the unique manner of distributing
the speech-namely, through an on-demand video service-
diminished the government's interests in proscribing it,79 and that
there should be special constitutional rules "for nonprofit
corporate political speech funded overwhelmingly by
individuals."" Justice Stevens drew on these possibilities in
contending that "there were principled, narrower paths that a
Court that was serious about judicial restraint could have
taken."" For the majority, however, the "narrower paths" were
illusory, as they would have led to the incorrect result. As Chief
Justice Roberts explained in his concurrence, "we cannot
embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is narrow;
it must also be right."82
73. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 62 (2010); see also id. at 76 ("It
developed over time, fitfully, by a process in which principles and standards were tried and
sometimes eventually accepted, sometimes abandoned, sometimes modified, in light of
experience and an ongoing, explicit assessment of whether they were sound as a matter of
policy.").
74. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
75. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 72, at 39 ("The President criticized it. It became
the focus of controversy at the State of the Union address .... Polls showed overwhelming
dissatisfaction on both sides of the ideological line, and Congress considered action in
response.") (footnotes omitted).
76. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
77. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (overruling Austin and embracing the principle,
which the majority described as established by other precedents, that "the Government
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity").
78. See id. at 322-23.
79. See id. at 326.
80. Id. at 327.
81. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 375 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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Of course, Austin was up for grabs because the Court had put
it up for grabs. It was at the Court's own urging that the parties
briefed the question whether Austin should be overruled.83 A
majority of Justices saw the need for a new rule, and they showed
no hesitation in announcing it. Citizens United thus reflects a
sweeping displacement of precedent by a Rulemaking Court.
That said, the Citizens United opinion is not necessarily
incompatible with the common law tradition. The replacement of
old rules with new ones is a familiar feature of common law
judging.8 4 What is more, the Court frequently describes its new
rules as informed and inspired by backward-looking analysis-by
the consultation of precedents, history, and tradition. A
Rulemaking Court accordingly may evince the same attention to
the past as an Adjudicating Court.
Indeed, Citizens United itself is notable for the majority's
emphasis on precedent and its contention that Austin was
vulnerable based in part on its incompatibility with other
precedents. In terms of decisionmaking mode, the defining
feature of Citizens United is not that the Court ignored what had
gone before. It is that, when it came time to look to the future, the
Court was unwilling to confine itself to a narrow, case-specific
resolution. Whatever might be said of Citizens United on the
merits, its central lesson-"the Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate
identity""- came through loud and clear. The Court willingly
assumed the role of Rulemaker.
II. DOCKET CONTROL
Having sketched the Adjudicating and Rulemaking modes of
decisionmaking, we turn to their effects, assumptions, and
83. See id. at 396 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
majority decides this case on a basis relinquished below, not included in the questions
presented to us by the litigants, and argued here only in response to the Court's
invitation.").
84. Cf. Strauss, supra note 16, at 909 ("In fact, rules, as well as case-by-case decision
making, are an important part of the common law.").
85. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348 (majority opinion) ("The Court is thus
confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on
political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity and a post-Austin line that
permits them."); id. at 363 (arguing that "Austin ... itself contravened this Court's earlier
precedents in Buckley and Bellotti").
86. Id. at 365.
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consequences for the way in which the Supreme Court goes about
its business. With respect to both types of courts, we shall
emphasize the importance of settlement and guidance. The
common lawyers were not motivated solely by "traditionalist"
considerations such as humility and restraint." They also
"insisted, plausibly in at least some cases, that it was important to
have certain matters settled because the costs of further
controversy were too great."" Matthew Hale described "the end
that Men might understand by what rule and measure to live &
possess" as "the prime reason . .. that the wiser Sort of the world
have in all ages agreed upon Some certain[] laws and rules."89
Building on the work of Hale, David Hume deemed it crucial to
have a publicly salient legal "rule or regularity" that allows parties
to "read the same message in the common situation" in order to
plan, coordinate, and cooperate.90 Whether it engages in
Adjudicating or Rulemaking, a constitutional court operating in
the common law tradition must be mindful of its obligation to
offer practical guidance. That obligation frames our analysis in the
sections that follow.
A. IMPLICATIONS OF ADJUDICATING
An Adjudicating Court offers guidance "through the careful
interstitial working out of shared understandings of common laws
and practices."9 1 The Adjudicating mode reflects the belief that
fashioning incremental, narrow decisions is preferable to
"creating a new rule which itself needs interpretation" before it
can offer effective guidance.92 From the Adjudicating Court's
perspective, any aspiration for greater generality in judicial
utterances is misguided, for the "ordering of civil societies. . .
when it comes to particulars" requires practical judgment
sensitive to the complexity of life.93 The Adjudicating Court will
87. Strauss, supra note 16, at 908.
88. Id.
89. Sir Matthew Hale, Reflections by the Lord Chiefe Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes
His Dialogue of the Lawe, in SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
503 (3d ed. 1945).
90. Gerald Postema, Some Roots in Our Notion of Precedent, in Precedent in Law
29 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (drawing on DAvID HUME, AN ENQUIRY
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (1751); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE (1738)).
91. Id. at 26.
92. Id.
93. See Hale, supra note 89, at 502; Postema, supra note 90, at 19-20.
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therefore be more interested in the fine-grained parsing and
distinguishing of previous decisions and the narrow resolution of
disputes based on the particular facts at issue. While the
Rulemaking Court strives to articulate a sound rule to govern
subsequent disputes, the Adjudicating Court applies specific law
to specific fact, leaving future cases to future courts. The guidance
of the Adjudicating Court is not an instruction manual, but rather
a melody whose next bars the listener can anticipate and continue
with confidence.94
Because the Adjudicating Court dispenses with the need for
articulating a sweeping rule, the costs of error in any given case
will tend to be lower. The Court's narrow focus will yield stripped-
down majority opinions-opinions that are fact-intensive but
relatively terse in developing the implications of the Court's
decision for future disputes. In turn, restrained majority opinions
will reduce the need for clarificatory concurrences, elaborate
dissents, and the consequent rounds of responsive editing that
separate writings engender.
These features give the Adjudicating Court the ability to
resolve more cases than the Rulemaking Court. And the
Adjudicating Court should resolve more cases if it is to keep faith
with the common law tradition. The nature of the Adjudicating
Court is to teach by example rather than edict; the key is what the
Court does rather than what it says. But for this approach to be
effective in bringing clarity and certainty to the law, exemplars
must emerge with regularity. The Adjudicating Court's
particularity creates a concomitant demand for frequency. The
more bars the Court hums, the better its audience will be at
picking up the tune.
Because guidance is a function of the number of decisions
issued and the breadth of each decision, the Adjudicating Court
must compensate for its narrowness on the latter score by
maintaining a sizable docket. This requirement has implications
for the criteria upon which certiorari is granted. For an
Adjudicating Court, a request for error correction in the absence
94. It is fitting that some of today's most prominent defenders of classical theories
of the common law draw connections between law and melody. See Allan Beever,
Formalism in Music and Law, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 213 (2011); Gerald J. Postema, Melody
and Law's Mindfulness of Time, 17 RATIO JURIS 203 (2004). Cf. RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (analogizing law to a chain novel authored by successive
interpreters).
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of a circuit split should not doom a petition for review, particularly
if the case is of some practical importance. Likewise,
constitutional uncertainties should not linger in the lower courts
for the sake of letting them "percolate."" Even a shallow split
among the lower courts may highlight an area of genuine
confusion or a challenging legal question worth resolving. Of
course, there are limits on the number of interventions an
Adjudicating Court can undertake. If every zone of constitutional
law received the attention the Court has recently devoted to areas
such as the Confrontation Clause and the jury trial right, the
constitutional docket might swell to the point of unmanageability
regardless of whether the Court opted to issue concise, narrow-
gauge opinions. That is to say nothing of the nonconstitutional
docket: The Supreme Court has ultimate responsibility for
resolving federal statutory questions and stands atop a vast
administrative state that guarantees a steady stream of litigants
seeking review. Given the scope and complexity of modern
government, an Adjudicating Court has considerable challenges
in front of it.
Yet those challenges are not insurmountable. A Supreme
Court that decided twenty, thirty, or forty additional cases per
year would have substantially more opportunities to engage with
constitutional doctrine on a granular level.96 And continuing that
practice year after year could generate momentum in multiple
areas of jurisprudence, giving lower courts and other stakeholders
a better idea of the trajectory of the law. This is not to suggest that
the Court could grapple with the entire universe of constitutional
doctrine during a single Term.' The Court could, however, select
more pockets of the law to develop through regular applications
over a course of several years, thus increasing the number of
domains in which it operates in Adjudicating mode.
95. Cf. Carrington & Cramton, supra note 30, at 622 ("[T]he Supreme Court has in
recent decades left many, many questions unresolved despite conflicts in circuit court
opinions.").
96. An expansion of the Court's docket need not occur solely through the
discretionary certiorari process. For example, Amanda Tyler has suggested a
reinvigoration of the certification process to enhance the uniformity of federal law. See
Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court's Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1310, 1327-28 (2010). Cf. Carrington & Cramton, supra note 30,
at 630-36 (proposing a panel of federal judges with authority to grant certiorari for the
Supreme Court).
97. See Hart, supra note 1, at 96 ("[W]hat matters about Supreme Court opinions is
not their quantity, but their quality.").
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B. IMPLICATIONS OF RULEMAKING
Rulemaking can be an effective means of providing guidance
to lower courts and other stakeholders when a superior court
explains its decisions in rich and comprehensive terms.98 Even
when broad rules are hazy around the edges, they can resolve
numerous questions about the state of the law and the universe of
plausible arguments. The effect is to enhance the clarity with
which the law is understood and the firmness with which the law
is established. The resulting certainty and publicity help to ensure
that citizens can comprehend and react to background legal
rules.99
Broad rulings can also promote uniformity among the lower
courts.'o To the extent a system places value upon the consistent
treatment of similarly situated individuals, the reduction of
disuniformity is another benefit of the Rulemaking approach. 0 '
Even if it intervenes regularly over the years, the Adjudicating
Court must accept that disuniformity and uncertainty will persist
for some period of time as the law is gradually worked out. It
tolerates that cost in light of countervailing virtues of deciding
cases in the context of specific, discrete disputes.10 2 The
98. See Schauer, supra note 59, at 206 ("[W]hile the [Supreme] Court is issuing
significantly fewer opinions, the lower courts are being called upon to decide substantially
more cases. Consequently, and in light of these changes, we might suppose that the
Supreme Court would now be increasingly attuned to providing guidance to the lower
courts about what the law is.").
99. See Paul Yowell, Legislation, Common Law, and the Virtue of Clarity, in
RICHARD EKINS, MODERN CHALLENGES TO THE RULE OF LAW 121 (2011) ("Clarity is
central and strategic because it both presupposes and gives vital sense to the desiderata of
promulgation, prospectivity, generality, and stability."); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 46-51, 63-65 (1969) (identifying clarity, publicity, and generality among the
desiderata of the rule of law).
100. Rules that are too broad, of course, can themselves sow uncertainty. See Yowell,
supra note 99, at 101 ("Clarity ... is a kind of Aristotelian mean between overbreadth and
overspecificity."); Carrington & Cramton, supra note 30, at 623 (criticizing the Court's
tendency "to write ever longer opinions invoking ever broader propositions of law that
others may or may not read to resolve diverse future cases").
101. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817,852 (1994) ("National uniformity of federal law ensures
that courts treat similarly situated litigants equally-a result often considered a hallmark
of fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law."); cf. Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme
Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1363, 1366 (2006) (arguing that "the facts show beyond the slightest doubt that the Court
is willing to allow conflicts in federal law to exist-and even worse, to persist"); but see
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008).
102. See Tyler, supra note 96, at 1316-17 (arguing that "[it should be more than a
little troubling that the myriad questions left in the wake of the Apprendi v. New Jersey,
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Rulemaking Court, by contrast, seeks to reduce uncertainty in
one fell swoop notwithstanding the risks that inhere in
formulating wide-ranging rules for scenarios not presently before
it.
The Rulemaking Court's aspiration is to maintain uniformity
while pursuing a systematic and coherent body of law. Preference
for Rulemaking may also imply rejection of the Adjudicating
Court's premise that, over time, a series of narrow and fact-
specific interventions will yield a coherent pattern. For one who
is skeptical of the promise of such coherence -perhaps because it
depends on an assumption of steady progression that faces
challenge from fractured courts whose membership changes over
time-the Rulemaking mode is the safer path to clarity and
consistency."o'
But along with the advantages of Rulemaking come risks.
Due to the significant costs that can arise from giving wide
application to a constitutional rule that turns out to be unsound
or unworkable, a Rulemaking Court should seek as much
information and engage in as much deliberation as practicable. Its
tendency should be to allow extensive consideration by the lower
courts before acting, and to consult an array of specialist amicus
briefs in route to understanding the full scope of implications its
rulings are likely to have. The Rulemaking Court must also ensure
that it selects representative cases that pose the relevant issues as
cleanly and fully as possible, so as to increase the chances that its
pronouncements will be properly understood by lower courts and
other stakeholders. It does little good, and may do considerable
harm, for a Rulemaking Court to spend its time on cases that do
not present generalizable and oft-litigated issues." Likewise, the
Blakely v. Washington, and United States v. Booker decisions effectively have resulted in
disparate sentencing schemes around the country, notwithstanding that the relevant
criminal punishment is being meted out by the same sovereign") (footnotes omitted).
103. See Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY
AND COMMON LAW 8, 23 (William Twining ed., 1986) (arguing that when "cohesion has
begun to break down [in a common law system] and a failure to achieve consensus becomes
a commoner phenomenon, interest will develop ... in the formulation of rules as to the
use of authorities-that is to say warrants or proofs that this or that is the law").
104. See Schauer, supra note 59, at 222 (arguing with respect to the Supreme Court's
decision in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), that "in reality the question the Court
answered was one virtually unique to the case before it. And by answering that unique
question, and studiously answering no other, the Court said virtually nothing relevant to
the large number of school speech cases that actually occupy the lower courts . . . ."); id. at
226 ("Thus, on a topic on which there is a considerable amount of disputation and
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Rulemaking Court should resist tarrying on error correction.
Instead, it should use divisions among the lower courts as proxies
for important, well-considered questions requiring focused
resolution.os And, in recogition of the high stakes of broad rules
and the substantial resources required to craft them, the
Rulemaking Court should explain itself with great care and in
great depth.
It follows that a Rulemaking Court should have a relatively
small docket.'06 Concerns about a court's competence to engage
in rulemaking are significantly reduced when the court has
adequate resources to devote to each case. Developing a rule is
less fraught when time pressures are minimized and capacity for
research and reflection is ample. This is particularly true for
courts that enjoy a robust infrastructure for decisionmaking. The
U.S. Supreme Court (when operating at full strength) consists of
nine Justices who are assisted by the opinions of lower courts, the
submissions of counsel and amici, and the support of some three
dozen law clerks along with research librarians and additional
staff. Professor Hart was right to worry that a Supreme Court that
issued 115 or 120 opinions in a Term might be "trying to decide
more cases than it can decide well," provided that we equate good
decisionmaking with the articulation of broad rules.'0 7 But the
calculus is much different for a Supreme Court that decides only
75 cases per year. The combination of substantial resources and a
slim docket gives the Justices a suitable framework for
articulating wide-ranging rules without being concerned that
cases are receiving inadequate attention. The Court may still
make some unsound judgments, but its miscues will not be for lack
of resources.
litigation, it appears that the Court took the wrong case, or at least a highly
unrepresentative one, and, having done so, proceeded to decide that case as narrowly as
possible.").
105. Cf William Baude, The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 1, 38 (2015) ("The [Supreme] Court does not reverse every error, or even every
clear error, that comes through the door.").
106. Cf Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458-59 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("Without adequate study there cannot be adequate reflection; without
adequate reflection there cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate discussion
there cannot be that fruitful interchange of minds which is indispensable to thoughtful,
unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions. It is therefore
imperative that the docket of the Court be kept down so that its volume does not preclude
wise adjudication.").
107. Hart, supra note 1, at 100.
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Finally, it is worth noting that the adoption of a Rulemaking
posture at the Supreme Court does not imply a similar mindset
among the lower courts. It is possible, and perhaps sensible, for
the Supreme Court to act as a Rulemaker even while the lower
courts operate in Adjudicating mode. Pursuant to this division of
responsibilities, the Supreme Court's constitutional interventions
would be limited in number but rich enough to furnish analytical
principles and doctrinal factors to guide the resolution of future
cases. At the same time, the lower courts-operating individually
and in conversation with each other-would develop the law
through the repeated application of overarching principles to
specific facts. The lower courts would fill in the details of the
Supreme Court's doctrinal sketches, allowing the judicial
department to leverage the benefits of Rulemaking and
Adjudicating alike. The more general point is that institutions at
different levels of the judicial hierarchy may adopt different
decisionmaking modes in their shared effort to build out the
meaning of constitutional law.
C. A NOTE ON TEXT AND STRUCTURE
Before closing this Part, we hasten to add that the text and
structure of the Constitution have potential implications for a
court's decisionmaking mode. Some commentators contend that
Article III's case-or-controversy requirement demands a case-
specific, incremental approach that forecloses attempts at broad
rulemaking.os Others argue that the hierarchical structure of the
federal judiciary creates a need for uniformity,10 9 which is best
achieved through the issuance of broad rulings by the Supreme
108. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1249, 1259 (2006) ("The constitutional function of the courts is to
adjudicate-to decide cases. The Constitution does not explicitly grant to courts the power
to make law."); id. at 1260 ("Courts make law only as a consequence of the performance
of their constitutional duty to decide cases. They have no constitutional authority to
establish the law otherwise."); cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2699 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our authority begins and ends with the need to adjudge the rights
of an injured party who stands before us seeking redress.").
109. See, e.g., JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT 38-39 (2009)
("[C]onsiderations of uniformity and convenience brooked large in the Framers' thinking
about the structure of the federal judiciary (as James Wilson's pyramidal conception of the
federal judiciary nicely confirms)."); id. at 41 (emphasizing the Supreme Court's
"responsibility to administer a uniform body of law and resolve the differences among
lower courts," a responsibility that is implied by "the Framers' very conception of a unitary
and hierarchical, rather than a plural and horizontal, judiciary").
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Court."o Though these issues are exceedingly important, we have
put them aside for present purposes. Our aim is simply to explore
what a court's docket management and mode of decisionmaking
reveal about the nature of its institutional role.
III. AGAINST GUIDANCE
Thus far we have explored two modes of common law
decisionmaking in the constitutional domain. Rulemaking Courts
frame their decisions in broad terms; Adjudicating Courts focus
on the narrow application of law to specific facts. We have argued
that the choice between these approaches carries implications for
the way in which a court shapes constitutional discourse. An
Adjudicating Court may present its individual decisions narrowly,
but it must issue a relatively high number of those decisions in
order to furnish adequate guidance to the legal community. As
applied to the U.S. Supreme Court, it makes little difference
whether such decisions are part of the Court's merits docket
(which entails full briefing and argument) or whether they emerge
in the form of summary reversals."' Either way, the Supreme
Court must provide a sustained dialogue with the lower courts and
other stakeholders. By comparison, a Rulemaking Court decides
a smaller number of cases but compensates with wide-ranging
opinions. Freed from the pressures of an onerous docket, the
Rulemaking Court enjoys the capacity to treat every case as an
occasion for extensive exposition.
These divergent approaches to common law judging embody
a shared commitment to the Supreme Court's role in furnishing
guidance about the meaning of constitutional norms. In this Part,
we examine two decisionmaking modes that reflect a different
conception of the Supreme Court's role-a conception, we shall
argue, that resides outside the common law paradigms.
110. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) ("[I]n our current judiciary, the Court can review only a
fraction of the lower federal and state court cases raising federal questions. The Court must
therefore make the most of the cases it does hear by issuing broad (maximal) decisions
that guide the lower courts in the many cases that it lacks the capacity to review.").
111. See Baude, supra note 105, at 31 (observing that "[m]any of the Court's summary
reversals appear to be designed to ensure that lower courts follow Supreme Court
precedents").
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A. RELUCTANCE
A court may decide a small number of cases and frame its
decisions narrowly. This is the approach of a Reluctant Court.
The Reluctant mindset is evident in the Supreme Court's
recent episodes of granting certiorari on, and then assiduously
avoiding, significant constitutional questions. In Bond v. United
States, for example, the Court had an opportunity to determine
whether a ratified treaty can grant Congress lawmaking power not
otherwise conferred via the Constitution's enumerated powers.'12
Although three Justices were willing to say the implementing
statute exceeded Congress's authority, a majority of the Court
avoided the question by reading the statute narrowly.1 13 Similarly,
in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, the Court stepped into a dispute
over the First Amendment rights of the broadcast media." 4
Rather than addressing the (fully briefed) First Amendment
question, the Court rested on the narrower ground that the FCC's
failure to provide fair notice of the bounds of legality violated due
process."' Situations like these illustrate the Court speaking
sparsely as well as softly. Such is the predilection of the Reluctant
Court."1 6
Such reluctance, we submit, falls short of discharging the
primary obligations of a constitutional court operating in the
112. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
113. See id. at 2088-93 (refusing to infer congressional intent to alter the federal/state
balance in responsibility for criminal law); id. at 2098-2102 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(addressing the underlying constitutional question).
114. 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
115. Id. at 2320 ("[Bjecause the Court resolves these cases on fair notice grounds
under the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First Amendment implications of
the Commission's indecency policy."). This cautious tendency also seems to have migrated
to the Court's resolution of major questions of statutory interpretation. In Bond, for
example, the majority sought to cabin the reach of its non-textualist approach to the
relevant statute, explaining that "[t]his case is unusual, and our analysis is appropriately
limited" and justified by an "exceptional convergence of factors." Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2093.
See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (stretching the
canon against extraterritorial application of statutes to avoid resolving whether the Alien
Tort Statute applies to corporations).
116. Reluctance also marked the Court's decisionmaking in major cases during
October Term 2015. Consider the birth-control-mandate cases, where the Court requested
supplemental briefing in route to vacating and remanding on narrow grounds. See Zubik
v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 2016 WL 2842449 (2016). Or consider the Court's similar
decision to avoid a challenging standing question in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
2016 WL 2842447 (2016). Even if these instances of reluctance owe to the absence of a
ninth Justice who could settle 4-4 splits, they resemble similar examples in recent years
during which the Court was operating at full strength.
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common law tradition. A court that speaks both rarely and
guardedly fails to provide the requisite clarity and certainty
regarding the content of constitutional norms.1 17 Of course, it does
not necessarily follow that Reluctance is unjustifiable. For
starters, a Reluctant Jurist might believe that the Adjudicating
mode is not as effective as its champions claim. One need not go
so far as to accept Jeremy Bentham's argument that the common
law is "dog law"' in order to conclude that requiring people to
predict the arc of precedent is a precarious method of securing
rights and facilitating coordination and cooperation."' Not every
lawyer, let alone every citizen, can intuit the direction of a
common law that changes even as its rules are applied.
Anxieties about the effectiveness of judicial guidance might
also trace to the Supreme Court's nature as a multi-member
tribunal. The issuance of practical guidance via frequent,
incremental interventions is most effective when judges operate
with a shared sense of reasonableness about the content and
contours of constitutional doctrine-in other words, when there
is a "convergence of judgment on common solutions."'2 0 As we
noted in Part I, the Adjudicating model depends on the
assumption that a line of narrow decisions eventually will produce
a coherent legal rule. That prospect may be put in jeopardy by a
sharply divided court whose changing composition often
generates sharp deviations in litigated outcomes. Rather than
117. Cf Schauer, supra note 59, at 227 (arguing that "[i]n recent years the Court has
appeared especially unconcerned with the guidance aspect of its work, and has perhaps
taken to heart a bit too much the importunings of those who would have it act minimally
and decide merely 'one case at a time"').
118. Jeremy Bentham, Truth Versus Ashhurst, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 235 (John Bowring ed., 1843) ("When your dog does anything you want to
break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you make
laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you and me."). Bentham's
analogy is ghastly, but it underscores his disdain of the retroactivity he saw in the common
law. (Incidentally, as pet owners, we would suggest that the positive reinforcement of good
behaviors makes for a far more humane and effective jurisprudence of dog law.)
119. Cf. RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 125 (2012)
("Public promulgation and canonical formulation [in legislation] make the legal change
easier to locate and grasp than that found in unwritten custom or in the best understanding
of a line of cases."); Yowell, supra note 99, at 121 (arguing that "clarity is best achieved by
making law through legislation" in "codes and statute books" and that the common law is
an "inferior mode of lawmaking that deviates from rule of law values in important
respects").
120. Postema, supra note 30, at 10; see also Simpson, supra note 103, at 21-22
(emphasizing the importance of normative cohesion and consensus in the classical
common law tradition).
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facilitating the gradual crystallization of legal principles, a series
of interventions by a vacillating or sharply divided Supreme Court
may lead to cloudiness and confusion.121
But the wide-ranging, forward-looking, and canonical
statements that characterize the Rulemaking Court create their
own concerns. Perhaps the cases that come before the Court, even
if they have been carefully vetted, provide an unrepresentative
view of the relevant field. The equities of particular cases might
also skew efforts at broad rulemaking in ways that subsequent
revisions cannot cure.122 Furthermore, one might conclude that
the Supreme Court's mandate to act only in reaction to
particularized cases and controversies limits its effectiveness in
controlling its rulemaking agenda. And there is the additional
worry that, as compared to legislators or expert administrative
agencies, generalist judges simply lack the competence to craft
broad decisions, no matter how many law clerks, amicus briefs,
and spare hours they have.12 ' In the most extreme case, a Supreme
Court Justice who harbors these concerns might favor retracing
the steps of Bentham, who began by seeking to improve the
common law through the use of forwarding-looking rules only to
abandon that project in favor of a comprehensive code that
minimizes judicial discretion.124
121. This phenomenon can be seen in vexing areas of jurisprudence such as the
application of the Establishment Clause. See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment
Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) ("One of the few things constitutional scholars
of every stripe seem to agree about is the proposition that the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is an incoherent mess.").
122. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006).
See also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978)
(identifying the limits of adjudication in resolving complex, polycentric social problems).
123. See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (explaining, in considering
the constitutionality of capital punishment, that legislatures "are better qualified to weigh
and evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with
a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts") (quotation omitted); ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 242-43 (2006) (doubting the Court's
"competence to evaluate moral arguments [presented in materials like the "Philosopher's
Brief" on a constitutional right to assisted suicide] and also to ask about facts and
incentives" relevant to policy choices); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional
Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 755-58 (2008) (arguing that as compared to agencies'
ability to undertake "wide-ranging investigations," a lay judge's understanding will "be
fragmentary and quite likely outdated"); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug?
Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998)
("[Ajgencies have become modern America's common law courts, and properly so.").
124. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 191-
217 (1986) (tracing this evolution of Bentham's thought).
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Given the drawbacks of both Adjudicating and Rulemaking,
the argument goes, the Supreme Court should free itself of the
idea that its interventions are invariably positive from the
standpoint of legal guidance. Instead, it should adopt a posture of
reluctance: It should inject itself into constitutional debates only
on rare occasions, and it should say as little as possible even then.
Put differently, the Reluctant Jurist concludes that the common
law ideal, whatever its merits in other times and contexts, should
not be the animating vision of constitutional law in our large,
complex polity.
This position, though, is unpersuasive. Even a Reluctant
Court will need to explain its reasons for its comparatively rare
interventions, if only to ensure that parties avoid hitting a
particular constitutional tripwire again and again. Unless the
Court is to reject judicial review entirely or limit itself to summary
affirmations and reversals without opinion, the creation of
constitutional doctrine is inevitable. A Reluctant Court
accordingly must consider how best to offer authoritative
guidance through what small dollops of doctrine it develops. In
doing so, it has little choice but to try to overcome the challenges
that led it to doubt the common law ideal in the first place.
The challenges of developing clear constitutional doctrine
are not the only possible explanations for judicial reluctance.
Perhaps a court is reluctant because it believes that, within a
democracy, much of the content of constitutional law should be
developed through mechanisms outside the judiciary.12 5 For
example, Keith Whittington has argued that matters of
constitutional construction-by which he means judgments made
"in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive meaning" -are the
provinces of democratic politics.'2 6 He argues that "where the text
is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful
but exhaustive reduction to legal rules,"127 any "efforts by the
courts to fill remaining gaps in the law represent political
choices."12 8 While the courts may legitimately engage in
125. Cf Schauer, supra note 23, at 458 ("A judge who makes law is simultaneously
deciding not to defer to some other lawmaking institution.").
126. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 5 (2001); see also
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
127. WHITTINGTON, supra note 126, at 5.
128. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation 157 (1999).
2016] 249
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:221
construction by "provisionally maintaining constitutional
understandings widely shared by other political actors," they may
not go any further. Acting as "innovators on behalf of
constitutional understandings that are not widely shared by other
political actors" would strain the legitimacy of their behavior. 129
Building from this type of analysis, one might defend the
Reluctant Court as properly cognizant of the limits of its authority
to resolve political debates without the anchor of determinate
positive law (such as constitutional text) or widely shared
constitutional understandings. On this account, the Reluctant
Court is principally concerned with issues other than the judicial
development of constitutional rules and principles.
Yet that depiction is difficult to square with the modem
Supreme Court's insistence on preserving and exercising its
Marbury-given right to announce the content of the law. It is
conceivable that the Court might someday move systematically in
the direction of political deference to avoid trespassing into
constitutional spaces that belong to the people and their politics.
At present, such deference is sporadic at best. If the Court wishes
to establish for itself a principled reluctance, it has the burden of
explaining the reasons behind that approach, the attendant
conceptualization of the judiciary's role in constitutional
discourse, and the manner in which it will bring its judgment to
bear consistently across cases.
B. EXPERIMENTING
Standing in opposition to the Reluctant Court is the
Experimental Court. Like the Adjudicating Court, the
Experimental Court seeks to resolve many cases. But in crafting
its opinions, the Experimental Court pursues the broad guidance
and deep reasoning associated with the Rulemaking mode of
decisionmaking.
The Experimental Court brings our project full-circle to the
concerns expressed by Professor Hart. Deep and broad
rulemaking in case after case would test the Supreme Court's
institutional capacity. The likely result would be the proliferation
of unsound and short-sighted decisions. The Experimental Court
might respond by using its large docket for frequent course
129. Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 119, 129 (2010).
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corrections over time. But the inevitable switchbacks, blind alleys,
dead-ends, and U-turns on the road to equilibrium would levy a
heavy toll on the legal system. In the worst-case scenario, the
Experimental Court might even become a Flailing Court, driving
the polity down roads to nowhere, or at least nowhere worthwhile.
That type of Court is most vulnerable to the kind of criticism that
Professor Hart levied: sacrificing quality to quantity and
deliberation to haste.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has considered the relationship between the
Supreme Court's management of its docket, its mode of
decisionmaking, and its institutional role. Along the way, we have
drawn distinctions between the nature of a Rulemaking Court, an
Adjudicating Court, a Reluctant Court, and an Experimental
Court. In reality, of course, the modern Supreme Court is all these
things, and more. Sometimes it acts as an eager Rulemaker,
reaching out to settle an area of law and to direct the law's path
forward. At other times it is an Adjudicator, becoming interested
in a particular issue and developing it-narrowly, methodically,
incrementally- over the course of years. In still other contexts,
the Court is Reluctant, limiting its own role even when
constitutional disputes are squarely presented for resolution.
Finally, the Court may be Experimental, aggressively expanding
its docket and sweeping broadly as it goes. These competing
approaches are all the more salient because debates over the
Court's institutional role often arise within the context of hot-
button controversies. Depending on one's perspective, the same
case might implicate the judicial "province and duty" to "say what
the law is" or the constitutional imperative for judges to limit
themselves to the "particular cases" in front of them-with both
precepts tracing their lineage to no lesser authority than
Marbury.130
An eclectic or undulating vision of the Supreme Court's role
is not necessarily untenable. But there must be some reason why
the Court is willing to intervene repeatedly in certain areas -thus
opening up the possibility of operating as an Adjudicating
130. Compare U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (invoking "say what the
law is" language), with id. at 2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking "particular case"
language).
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Court-even as it engages with other issues in sporadic fashion.13 1
Is the Court more comfortable with the Adjudicating or
Rulemaking mode? Does its choice owe to considerations of
constitutional structure, political philosophy, pragmatic calculus,
or otherwise?1 32 Alternatively, is ours an era in which the Court's
self-imposed mandate is not to lead, but to follow? If so, is the
Court's rationale for this understanding related to institutional
competence, or capacity, or a resetting of the constitutional
separation of powers? Is it simply a tactical ceasefire between
Justices who cannot agree on a methodology of constitutional
interpretation? 133 And in all events, what vision of the Court's
institutional role do the Justices employ to guide their actions
(and inactions)? Only upon answering these questions can we
determine what kind of court we have.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's discretionary docket isn't so
discretionary after all. To be sure, the Court remains in charge of
choosing its own cases. But its approach to case selection creates
obligations for its crafting of opinions. We sometimes talk of the
Court's certiorari decisions as distinct from its "merits docket."
That distinction should not obscure the relationship between case
selection and opinion writing. It is the interplay between docket
management and decisionmaking style that defines the role of the
Court.
131. Cf Carrington & Cramton, supra note 30, at 606 (arguing that the Court's
certiorari practice is unprincipled and lacks transparency).
132. Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Common Law Court or Council of Revision?, 101
YALE L.J. 949, 950-51 (1992) (distinguishing a depiction of the Supreme Court as a
"paradigmatic common law adjudicator" from a depiction of the Court as a "Council of
Revision" empowered to "veto[] legislation on grounds of morality or prudence, not just
irreconcilability with constitutional commands").
133. See Owens & Simon, supra note 7, at 1224.
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